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Visuo-cognitive disambiguation 
of occluded shapes
Rob van Lier
Nijmegen Institute for Cognition and Information (NICI), University of
Nijmegen, The Netherlands. r.vanlier@nici.kun.nl
www.nici.kun.nl/People/LiervanRJ/index.html/
Abstract: Pessoa et al. (1998a) underexposed the broad and rich variety
of stimuli in the amodal completion domain. The disambiguation of oc-
cluded shapes depends on very specific figural properties. Elaborations
on such disambiguations of rich and complex stimuli, tied up with a visuo-
cognitive origin of amodal completion, further position Pessoa et al.’s con-
siderations on neural filling-in and the personal-subpersonal distinction.
Pessoa et al. (1998a) have written an impressive paper on percep-
tual completion, comprising a wide scope of phenomena with di-
verse phenomenological qualities. Amodal completion certainly
belongs to the weakest of the discussed completion phenomena.
Every observer can witness that the phenomenological presence of
amodal contour completions is not as compelling as, for example,
blind spot filling-in, neon color spreading, or even the perception
of illusory contours. Nevertheless, convincing psychophysical data
exist on the relevance of amodal contour completions as well.
Much of the research in the domain is concerned with the disam-
biguation of occluded shapes. That is, while in fact an infinitive
number of different completions are possible for each and every
visual pattern, only a few of them are plausible. Although Pessoa
et al. briefly mentioned that local and global figural properties may
influence completion, the richness of the domain, the diversity of
completions, and the vision-versus-cognition dilemma (typical of
this domain), are underexposed and not related to their own con-
cepts (e.g., the personal-subpersonal distinction). This is a missed
opportunity.
Whereas in local approaches, completion depends on specific
local configurations and proceeds by way of curved or linear in-
terpolation between contour ends, in global approaches specific
overall shape regularities (like bilateral symmetries) determine
completion.1 It is important to note here that local and global
strategies may converge to the same shape but may also diverge
to different shapes. The relevance of and competition between,
both types of completions have been investigated by, for example,
Sekuler (1994), Sekuler et al. (1994), and Van Lier et al. (1994;
1995a; 1995b).2 The stimulus-dependent plausibility of a small set
of completions is not as self-evident as it might seem to be. For
example, with his “ignorance-of-absence” assumption Dennett
(1991) also disregards the specific influence of figural properties
on completion by stating that the brain jumps to a conclusion (the
issue here would be: what conclusion?).
The unique status of a small set of completions also holds if the
stimulus domain is further extended, for example, to a completion
of the unseen back of a nonfamiliar object (Van Lier & Wagemens
1999) or so-called fuzzy completions of quasi-irregular shapes
(Van Lier 1999). The more enriched the stimuli (see also Fig.1),
the more compelling the question of whether we are (still) deal-
ing with visual completions. Would there be a fundamental dif-
ference between the visual and/or cognitive processing of, say, a
partly occluded square and the back of a tree trunk (Van Lier
1999)? Is a simple “vision/cognition” verdict possible anyway?
As briefly indicated by Pessoa et al., the vision-versus-cognition
issue has been part of the debate in the literature. In particular,
global completions are often thought to be cognitive (e.g., Kanizsa
1985). So far, however, psychophysical evidence for the relevance
of local and global amodal completions does not rigorously sep-
arate visual processing from cognitive processing. In addition,
investigating this issue in terms of neural activation in the visual
cortical area will turn out to be a hazardous enterprise – not
only because the presumed mapping between the responsible
neural substrate and the specific completion is unclear (see also
Pessoa et al.), but also because there is simply no clear-cut bor-
der where the visual system ends and the cognitive system starts.3
So, even if there were evidence on the neural filling-in of the
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Commentary on Luiz Pessoa, Evan Thompson, and Alva Noë (1998) Finding out about filling-in: A guide to
perceptual completion for visual science and the philosophy of perception. BBS 21:723 –802.
Abstract of the original article: In visual science the term filling-in is used in different ways, which often leads to confusion. This tar-
get article presents a taxonomy of perceptual completion phenomena to organize and clarify theoretical and empirical discussion. Ex-
amples of boundary completion (illusory contours) and featural completion (color, brightness, motion, texture, and depth) are exam-
ined, and single-cell studies relevant to filling-in are reviewed and assessed. Filling-in issues must be understood in relation to
theoretical issues about neural–perceptual isomorphism and linking propositions. Six main conclusions are drawn: (1) visual filling-in
comprises a multitude of different perceptual completion phenomena; (2) certain forms of visual completion seem to involve spatially
propagating neural activity (neural filling-in) and so, contrary to Dennett’s (1991; 1992) recent discussion of filling-in, cannot be de-
scribed as results of the brain’s “ignoring an absence” or “jumping to a conclusion”; (3) in certain cases perceptual completion seems
to have measurable effects that depend on neural signals representing a presence rather than ignoring an absence; (4) neural filling-
in does not imply either “analytic isomorphism” or “Cartesian materialism,” and thus the notion of the bridge locus – a particular neural
stage that forms the immediate substrate of perceptual experience – is problematic and should be abandoned; (5) to reject the rep-
resentational conception of vision in favor of an “enactive” or “animate” conception reduces the importance of filling-in as a theoret-
ical category in the explanation of vision; and (6) the evaluation of perceptual content should not be determined by “subpersonal” con-
siderations about internal processing, but rather by considerations about the task of vision at the level of the animal or person
interacting with the world.
unseen back of a tree trunk, it would not necessarily resolve the
vision-cognition dilemma.
What really needs careful investigation in connection with amodal
completion, is the convergence from an infinitive number of pos-
sible completions to a small class of preferred completions, the in-
tra/interobserver consistency on these completions, and their re-
lation to relevant figural properties. The necessity of an entangles
visuo-cognitive account of completions, being an inextricable part
of our interpretation of the surrounding world, comes close to Pes-
soa et al.’s personal-level account. However, the apparent system-
atic relation between preferred completions and particular figural
aspects calls for investigation into the underlying visuo-cognitive
mechanisms which inevitably touch the subpersonal level Pessoa
et al. find less important.
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NOTES
1. Pessoa et al. incorrectly classified the Wouterlood and Boselie’s
(1992) “local” approach as “hybrid” (which would account for global and
local aspects).
2. Within the context of Structural Information Theory, the approach
of Van Lier et al. (1994) incorporates both global and local aspects in con-
trast with the earlier approach of Buffart et al. (1981).
3. Top-down activations in the visual cortical area as in, for example,
mental imagery, or (still to be unraveled) complex cortical “loops,” would
only further diffuse such a distinction.
Perceptual filling-in and the resonant binding
of distributed cortical representations
Tony Vladusich
Centre for Visual Science, Research School of Biological Sciences,
Canberra, ACT, 2601, Australia. vladusich@rsbs.anu.edu.au
Abstract: Pessoa et al. (1998a) summarize a wide body of data suggesting
that perceptual filling-in phenomena can be attributed to neural filling-in
processes. However, they reject, on philosophical grounds, the hypothesis
that filled-in representations in the brain are the immediate substrate of
visual percepts. It is proposed in this commentary that resonant binding
between distributed cortical areas may instead be the crucial ingredient
for conscious visual percepts, and that filling-in processes may facilitate
the interactions between behaving organisms and object surfaces. These
suggestions circumvent some of the philosophical problems associated
with the idea of localized visual representations.
The recent target article of Pessoa et al. (1998) on the relationship
between perceptual filling-in and its putative neural substrates has
provoked a lively debate (see accompanying commentaries and re-
sponse). Perceptual “filling-in” is the attribution of visual proper-
ties, such as form, color, texture, or motion, to regions of the vi-
sual field (e.g., retinal blind spot) that receive little or no direct
sensory stimulation (Ramachandran 1992). Pessoa et al. outline a
wide body of evidence favoring the conclusion that perceptual fill-
ing-in can be identified with a spatial (topographic) spreading of
neural activity in the brain (i.e., neural filling-in). However, the au-
thors reject the idea of a one-to-one “isomorphic” relationship be-
tween perception and neural activity; that is, “an ultimate neural
foundation in which an isomorphism obtains between neural ac-
tivity and the subject’s experience” (p. 742). One reason for re-
jecting the idea of isomorphism is that it implies that there is a “fi-
nal stage” in the brain where neural activity maps directly onto
perceptual states; “Why must there be one particular neural stage
whose activity forms the immediate substrate of visual percep-
tion?” (p. 742). This objection is certainly not new, having featured
prominently in Gibson’s (1979) arguments against the notion of
perception as a form of representation. Indeed, Gibson’s direct
theory of visual perception, and his notion of reciprocal interac-
tions between perceiving organisms and environment, were de-
rived as alternatives to the notion of neural representation (see
Ullman 1980).
A related problem with the idea of isomorphic neural filling-in
concerns the impression that the brain is somehow “painting” in-
ternal pictures of the external world. Inevitably the question arises
as to who or what is “looking at” the internal panoramic canvas.
This type of reasoning suffers from the paradox that neural mech-
anisms in the brain are attributed to the qualities of entire (per-
ceiving) organisms (i.e., the qualities of perception). Gibson (1979)
circumvented this paradox by suggesting that the proper subject
of perception is the whole organism interacting with its environ-
ment, not its constituent representational apparatus. Such an idea
has the advantage of “closing the loop” between the perceiver and
what is perceived.
Pessoa et al. themselves adopt what might be termed a “neo-
Gibsonian” perspective of filling-in (cf. Marr 1982); “the task of
vision is not to produce representations from images, but rather
to discover through the perceptual system what is present in the
world and where it is” (p. 744). The authors claim that “neural
filling-in helps the animal find out about its environment” (p. 790)
by integrating local neural responses at object edges into global
estimates of surface properties (form, color, texture, and motion).
To avoid the pitfalls of isomorphism, Pessoa et al. suggest that
neural filling-in “is sufficient to produce the percept, but not to
constitute it” (p. 787), meaning that perception “is inherently
world-involving and therefore cannot be reductively identified
with neural states inside the individual” (p. 788). This suggestion
might profitably be viewed as a neo-Gibsonian theory wherein
perception involves the moment-to-moment interactions or “res-
onances” between animal and environment. However, the idea
that perception is ultimately “world-involving” has traditionally
been a difficult one to assess (Ullman 1980), possibly because no-
tions like animal-environment resonances offer little in the way of
putative physical mechanisms (cf. Grossberg 1980).
This commentary advocates a framework which might serve to
alleviate the respective difficulties associated with (1) the putative
relationship between filling-in and visual perception, and (2) Gib-
son’s insights concerning reciprocal animal-environment interac-
tions. In particular, we consider how the outputs of a process like
neural filling-in might facilitate the effective control of behavior
in a “closed loop” dynamical system. The question is: How might
functionally specialized brain regions work together as a single
functional unit to control behavior? One plausible candidate is the
dynamic “binding” of distributed cortical events through recipro-
cal exchange of information, or resonance (e.g., Grossberg 1995).
As Pessoa et al. point out, “brain regions are not independent
stages or modules, but rather interact reciprocally . . . the brain
relies on distributed networks that transiently coordinate their ac-
tivities” (p. 742). The implication here is that visual perception is
not a localized product of any single brain region or neural repre-
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Figure 1 (van Lier). A: Global-local convergence. B: Global-
local divergence. C: Global completion in the absence of a local
alternative. D: Fuzzy completion with many plausible comple-
tions. E: Two plausible completions of the back of an object (after
90° rotation about the vertical). F: Fuzzy object completion. Al-
though only very little is visible, most observers have a clear idea
about the object’s shape.
sentation, but rather emerges from the dynamic interactions be-
tween distributed brain regions. Visual perception may therefore
be viewed as an emergent property of reciprocal information flow
between multiple brain regions. While this idea is certainly not
new (Grossberg 1980), a few points can be made to clarify and ex-
tend the position.
Since the resonant binding of distributed codes in the brain re-
quires reciprocal anatomical connections between functional ar-
eas involved in (say) visual processing and motor control, the brain
as a whole can “close the information loop” in a unitary action-per-
ception cycle. This closed loop system effectively exorcises the
“homunculus” from the perceptual system, and confers no privi-
leged status on any particular neural representation, filled-in or
otherwise. Consistent with the suggestions of Pessoa et al., filling-
in or spatial integration may serve an important role in the guid-
ance of behavior by enabling an organism to interact with entire
object surfaces, without admitting any special significance to the
filling-in process itself. Further, the current view clarifies how
brain regions involved in motor control and three-dimensional
(3D) spatial representation can guide and modify perception by
means of “attentive looking” (Whittle 1998), involving feedback
(e.g., outflow commands) to occipital brain regions involved in
“bottom-up” visual processing. Spatial attention is thereby allo-
cated to objects that are relevant to the behavior of an organism.
This proposal also suggests how object “affordances” (Gibson
1979), the potential behavioral actions afforded by objects, might
arise by means of resonant binding between outflow motor com-
mands in frontal cortex and spatial/object representations in oc-
cipital, parietal, and temporal cortex.
The proposal outlined above is consistent with data from lesion
studies. For example, normal vision requires an intact temporal
cortex, as evidenced by the difficulty individuals suffering from
damage in the temporal lobe sometimes have in binding together
distributed object features into coherent objects. As noted in the
commentary of Walker and Mattingley (1998), patients with pari-
etal lesions fail to perceive, or neglect, regions of the visual field
contralateral to the cortical lesion. These patients, in effect, lose
their capacity for “attentive looking” (as distinct to physical look-
ing). Such evidence clearly indicates that visual perception re-
quires the functional integrity of distributed representations that
are not confined to the occipital lobe. Another example of the sig-
nificance of distributed representations in visual perception
comes from brain-imaging studies demonstrating that visual phe-
nomena, such as the McCollough effect (McCollough 1965), are
associated with activity in widely distributed brain regions, some
of which (e.g., prefrontal cortex) are not classically associated with
visual perception (e.g., Barnes et al. 1999). The illusory colors in
the McCollough effect are known to undergo filling-in (see
Broerse et al. 1999), leading to the suggestion that interactions be-
tween filling-in representations and “cognitive” (prefrontal) rep-
resentations may interact during the illusion. From this perspec-
tive, it is plausible to suggest that measurable effects on visual
perception could be generated by (say) lesions to the prefrontal
cortex, perhaps involving a disruption in the capacity for “atten-
tive looking” or visually guided exploration.
Authors’ Response
Filling-in: One or many?
Luiz Pessoa,a Evan Thompson,b and Alva Noëc
aDepartment of Computer and Systems Engineering, Center of Technology,
Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Ilha do Fundao, Rio de Janeiro, RJ
21945–970, Brazil; bDepartment of Philosophy and Centre for Vision
Research, York University, North York, Ontario, Canada M3J 1P3;
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Abstract: (1) The main issue with regard to modal and amodal
completion is not which phenomena are cognitive, and which per-
ceptual. At the level of the animal, both are visuo-cognitive. At the
level of visual processing, however, we need to dissect the differ-
ent functional effects of these kinds of completion. (2) Resonant
binding between distributed cortical areas may play a role in per-
ceptual completion, but evidence is needed.
Consider two extreme perceptual completion situations: (1)
a Kanizsa triangle, in which the illusory triangle appears
with marked contours and as visibly brighter than the white
area around it (which has the same luminance); and (2) an
object, such as a cat, appearing behind a picket fence. In
the first case, we see the triangle and the contours. In the
second, we perceive a cat (not merely the head and rear).
In the first case, there is good evidence that mechanisms of
contour integration at early visual stages play an important
role in the perception of the illusory contours (Peterhans &
von der Heydt 1989; von der Heydt & Peterhans 1989). In
the second, although early mechanisms undoubtedly play
an important role, most likely a host of other processes are
involved. Granted that the attempt to divide the mecha-
nisms involved in these two cases into distinct “perceptual”
and “cognitive” categories is unproductive, should the two
cases be treated equivalently?
Van Lier argues that because there is no clear-cut bor-
der where the visual system ends and the cognitive system
begins, we should think more generally of visuo-cognitive
completions or behaviors. Our answer is yes, and no.
First, the yes part. As we argue in our target article (Pes-
soa et al. 1998a), the point of vision at the level of the ani-
mal or subject is to bear witness to what goes on in the world,
not to gauge what goes in the head when one perceives. A
crucial feature of ordinary perceptual experience is its trans-
parency: perception aims directly at the world and does not
ordinarily involve beliefs about what goes on in the visual
system (Pessoa et al. 1998a; Noë et al., in press; Noë &
Thompson, in press). According to the enactive approach to
perception, what Marr (1982) called the computational task
of vision, is not the production of internal world-models, but
rather the guidance of action and exploration (Noë et al., in
press; Pessoa et al. 1988a; Thompson et al. 1992; Varela et
al. 1991; see also Ballard 1991; Clark 1996). The subject of
vision, in this way of thinking, is not the early-vision, infor-
mation-processing stream, but rather the whole, environ-
mentally-situated animal, actively engaged in movement
and exploration. At the level of the whole animal, percep-
tion, cognition, and action are interdependent capacities.
Therefore, to separate these capacities seems futile, not only
in the case of perceptual completion, but in general. For this
Continuing Commentary
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reason, when considering perceptual completion at the level
of the animal or person, we completely agree with van Lier
on the “necessity of an entangled visuo-cognitive account of
completions.” Indeed, this point reinforces our point in the
target article that perceptual content needs to be under-
stood at the level of the animal or person acting in the world,
for it implies that we need to think of the visual system not
as an encapsulated and “cognitively impenetrable” subper-
sonal module (Pylyshyn, in press), but rather as a system that
is fully integrated into the life of the cognitively endowed an-
imal (see Noë et al., in press).
But how should we study perceptual completion? Here
we disagree with van Lier. As we argue in the target arti-
cle (Pessoa et al. 1998a) and our “Authors’ Response” (Pes-
soa et al. 1998b), perceptual completion is not one phe-
nomenon, but many under the same heading. Without a
careful separation of these phenomena, we risk lumping to-
gether a number of different things. Is the brain simply “ig-
noring an absence,” as some researchers argue for the blind
spot (Dennett 1991; Kranda 1998; Neumann 1998)? Or is
it engaging topographically organized, early visual circuits
that mitigate the local indeterminacy of early measure-
ments through short-range interaction (see Pessoa et al.
1998a; Pessoa & Neumann 1998)? In the context of amodal
completion (see Rensink & Enns 1998), does the comple-
tion process itself posit new visual elements (e.g., extend-
ing contours and filling in surfaces)? Or does it simply im-
pose a nonvisual structure onto elements already present?
In this context, we argue that a fruitful strategy is to inves-
tigate the functional effects of completion. For example, if
illusory contours rely on the same kinds of mechanisms as
real contours, then we should expect to observe that after-
effects transfer between them. This is exactly what is ob-
served (Berkeley et al. 1994; Paradiso et al. 1989; see also
sects. 6.12 and 7.3.2 of Pessoa et al. 1998a).
The results of several studies suggest that the rep-
resentation of certain amodally completed surfaces is
“equivalent” to that of an associated “complete” version.
In other words, some early stages of the visual system treat
the two types of stimuli shown in Figure R1 as equivalent.
This is evidenced by the slow search times when amodally-
completed targets are searched in a field of distractors
(Rensink & Enns 1998; see also Davis & Driver 1998; He
& Nakayama 1994).
Other studies suggest that the visual system treats modal
and amodal completion quite differently. Some recent
studies of visual attention provide an example. It is well
known that attention “spreads” within regular, non-illusory
surfaces. For instance, subjects can identify two attributes
of a single object more efficiently than two attributes of dif-
ferent objects (e.g., Baylis & Driver 1993). More generally,
several well-known effects of attention have been found 
to apply to perceptual objects and not just spatial locations
(for discussion and references, see Lavie & Driver 1996;
Moore et al. 1998). Davis and Driver (1997; 1998) investi-
gated whether attention would spread within modally and
amodally completed illusory surfaces. (The two types of
surfaces differed minimally in their physical attributes, but
perceptually were quite different.) To their surprise, they
found that the two types of surfaces behaved quite differ-
ently in relation to attention: modally completed surfaces
exhibited the attention-spreading effect found in real, non-
illusory surfaces, whereas amodally completed surfaces did
not. As a result, Davis and Driver suggest that the percep-
tually salient, foreground properties of the modal surface
might be related to processes of attention.
In the studies discussed in the previous two paragraphs,
the central issue is not whether completion is perceptual or
cognitive, but rather how the early visual system treats
modally completed and amodally completed surfaces. The
fact of poor search performance (when amodally completed
targets are searched in a field of distractors) appears to in-
dicate that normal surfaces and amodally completed sur-
faces are both “real” to vision. Nevertheless, modal and
amodal completions have very different perceptual quali-
ties: for example, the latter have a less “present” or “en-
countered” character than the former (Kanizsa & Gerbino
1982). If Davis and Driver (1997; 1998) are right, this dif-
ference may be associated with attention. We wish to stress
that unless we dissect the functional effects of completion,
we risk missing the subtleties of these complex phenomena.
We have argued that perceptual completion comprises a
wide range of different phenomena, and therefore that it is
important not to prejudge such issues as whether modal
and amodal completion involve common neural mecha-
nisms. Indeed, it seems likely that the completion of a cat
behind a picket fence will depend on neural structures and
circuits that are not implicated in the perception of Kanizsa
figures. (There is evidence that the perceptual completion
in Kanizsa figures depends on “lower-level” processes: see
Ffytche & Zeki 1996; Hirsch et al. 1995). In any case, it
seems clear that acknowledgment of the heterogeneity of
different completion phenomena is necessary if we are to
advance our understanding of their various neural sub-
strates.
Vladusich accepts our position presented in the target
article, in particular our criticisms of analytic isomorphism
and our view that perceptual content needs to be under-
stood at the level of the animal interacting with the world.
He proposes that “resonant binding” among distributed
brain regions may play a role in perceptual completion. Al-
though this hypothesis is not unattractive, much more evi-
dence is needed, especially evidence that addresses partic-
ular cases of perceptual completion. In general, however,
Continuing Commentary
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Figure R1 (Pessoa et al.). Amodal completion study by Rensink
and Enns (1998). When subjects search for the target among a
field of distractors, their search times are slow, indicating that they
do not have access to the individual elements (notch plus circle),
but instead to something that more closely resembles the distrac-
tors (hence the difficulty). Thus, the target and the distractor are
treated similarly by the early visual system (indicated by the sec-
ond row of “objects”). Note, however, that no evidence for the ac-
tual representation of a filled-in surface was obtained.
we think that “dynamic brain mapping” of phase synchrony/
desynchrony in neural assemblies is one of the most promis-
ing approaches to studying the neural basis of perception
(see Rodriguez et al. 1999; Varela 1995), and we expect to
see significant advances along this front in coming years.
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More theory and evolution, please!
Radu J. Bogdan
Department of Philosophy, Tulane University, New Orleans, LA 70118.
bogdan@mailhost.tcs.tulane.edu
Abstract: Heyes’s (1998) skepticism about theory of mind (ToM) in non-
human primates exploits the idea of a strong and unified theory of mind
in humans based on an unanalyzed category of mental state. It also exploits
narrow debates about crucial observations and experiments while ne-
glecting wider evolutionary trends. I argue against both exploitations.
Heyes’s (1998) thought-provoking target article is a reminder that
a convincing argument for a theory-of-mind competence in non-
human primates remains hard to elaborate and defend. Lack of
robust naturalistic data and the rarity of decisive experiments are
not the only reasons, although they are reasons perhaps best ex-
ploited by Heyes’s skepticism. Equally frustrating may be some
lack of conceptual clarity and the hesitance to theorize beyond the
narrow boundaries of data and experiments. It is the latter short-
comings, also exploited by Heyes, that I want to address briefly in
what follows.
Why mental state? I am puzzled by the notion of mental state
placed at the heart of most analyses of the ToM competence. What
could it mean? And why treat it as a premise rather than an outcome
of inquiry? Philosophers have long disagreed about what mental
states are, cognitive scientists do not really care, ordinary language
is rather opaque but resolutely flexible and pragmatic about it, and
yet from early on many if not most ToM theorists have made the
mastery of a naïve category of mental state a test of having the ToM
competence. So does Heyes, using the test as a prop for her skepti-
cism. I think this is misleading and will explain why in a moment.
Right now I want to make a general methodological point.
It is a well-known metascientific axiom that theoretical concepts
in science, such as gravitation or gene, are usually defined implic-
itly in a given theory in terms of basic laws, causal or functional im-
plications, and various assumptions. It is a theory of the ToM com-
petence which ought to determine the nature of the categories that
structure and run the competence. It cannot be a prior and prethe-
oretical decision or expectation of what the competence should be.
This applies also to the human ToM: we should not regard it as a
genuine ToM because it fits pretheoretical expectations about men-
tal state concepts but because its theoretical analysis suggests so. In
short, the nature of the ToM categories and skills ought to follow
from, not premise, the theoretical inquiry. I am afraid that a good
part of the ToM field today suffers from a methodological inversion.
This inversion is exploited by skeptics like Heyes. Two further and
misleading assumptions also help such skepticism.
Unhelpful premises. Like many workers in this field, Heyes ac-
cepts two premises about ToM which are misleadingly modeled
on the adult human competence. One premise is that of a strong
ToM, based on mental state categories, such as belief, desire,
knowledge, which pick up types of mental conditions with causal
powers and often clear-cut verbal and behavioral manifestations.
The other premise is that of a unified ToM that operates by
smoothly integrating such concepts. I think these premises gen-
erate the wrong conditions for the argument for or against ToM in
nonhuman primates. Not having the space to elaborate this diag-
nosis (see Bogdan 1997; 1999) I restrict myself to a few pointers.
The first premise first. A ToM competence need not be men-
talist (i.e., based on mental state concepts that capture internal
conditions with causal powers) in order to be made of specialized,
functionally dedicated, and domain-specific skills. This is why an
argument for (or against) ToM must first reveal (or rule out) such
skills, not their mentalist character. If it turns out that nonmental-
ist skills are actually involved in the apes’ recognition of emotion,
information access (seeing), and gaze following, then there is a vi-
able alternative to the exclusive (and probably wrong) disjunction
between a mentalist ToM and associative learning (see also Gor-
don 1998).
The apes’ inability to recognize knowledge or attention in gaze or
seeing accordingly, need not invalidate the existence of domain-spe-
cific and specialized skills; rather it clarifies their functional profile
and limitations. Which brings me to the second premise, about a
unified ToM. There is no good reason to believe that ToM is one
tightly knit and homogenous competence or that it emerged whole-
sale at some discrete point in primate phylogeny or human on-
togeny. After 20 years of intense research, there are optimistic
grounds for believing that the primate ToM is made of a rich bat-
tery of skills that had evolved in fits and starts and in a variety of so-
cial, interpersonal, and cultural ambiances, building upon or con-
verging with or inserting themselves in still other skills, and that only
later in human childhood did language-based and thoroughly en-
culturated upgrades of such skills acquire a mentalist profile and
job. These later acquisitions provide no grounds to downgrade its
precursors to mere learning or chancy guesses, however.
Transcending the proximate. Yet neither of these points
against Heyes’s premises have much bite if we fail to take a wider
theoretical and evolutionary view of the matter, something that
Heyes does not do. Let me begin with a theoretical point that ad-
dresses Heyes’s skepticism about ToM in apes. Most organisms
evolve specialized organs and skills under assumptions about the
ecology in which they operate. (To cite major instances, Vogel
1988 analyzes this phenomenon in biology, in general, and Marr
1982 specifically in vision.) The body design of fish and birds
evolved under assumptions about the properties of the environ-
ments they travel through (water, air); on the artificial side, engi-
neers would design ships and planes under rather similar as-
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Commentary on C. M. Heyes (1998) Theory of mind in nonhuman primates. BBS 21:101–148.
Abstract of the original article: Since the BBS article in which Premack and Woodruff (1978) asked “Does the chimpanzee have a
theory of mind?,” it has been repeatedly claimed that there is observational and experimental evidence that apes have mental state
concepts, such as “want” and “know.” Unlike research on the development of theory of mind in childhood, however, no substantial
progress has been made through this work with nonhuman primates. A survey of empirical studies of imitation, self-recognition, so-
cial relationships, deception, role-taking, and perspective-taking suggests that in every case where nonhuman primate behavior has
been interpreted as a sign of theory of mind, it could instead have occurred by chance or as a product of nonmentalistic processes such
as associative learning or inferences based on nonmental categories. Arguments to the effect that, in spite of this, the theory of mind
hypothesis should be accepted because it is more parsimonious than alternatives or because it is supported by convergent evidence
are not compelling. Such arguments are based on unsupportable assumptions about the role of parsimony in science and either ignore
the requirement that convergent evidence proceeds from independent assumptions, or fail to show that it supports the theory of mind
hypothesis over nonmentalist alternatives. Progress in research on theory of mind requires experimental procedures that can distin-
guish the theory of mind hypothesis from nonmentalist alternatives. A procedure that may have this potential is proposed. It uses con-
ditional discrimination training and transfer tests to determine whether chimpanzees have the concept “see.” Commentators are in-
vited to identify flaws in the procedure and to suggest alternatives.
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sumptions. Assumptions are not an explicit part of the design of
an organ or skill or artifact (so they cannot be determined by just
looking at design) but are part of a wider ecology-organ/skill/arti-
fact package, which is naturally selected or deliberately envisaged
as a whole. The same is true of cognitive organs and skills. The vi-
sual system works under assumptions about light bouncing off sur-
faces, boundaries revealing shapes and volumes, and the like.
As part of cognition, the ToM skills are no exception. Assump-
tions about ecologies, natural and social, are an indelible comple-
ment to their design and operation. Assumptions also lead to a sort
of division of labor between a skill’s reach and the ecology’s com-
pletion of it: a skill usually exploits regularities or landmarks to do
what it was designed to do (Bogdan 1994). Thus, it could be that
the sociopolitical ecology of apes calls for specialized ToM skills to
track gaze and its direction (given their variable manifestations
and utilities and the urgency of their manipulation) but not its tar-
gets (given that what one gazes at is a basic goal shared by every-
body or can be determined contextually from various clues). It
could also be that the job of a ToM skill in apes or human children
consists precisely in patterning the right ecological, bodily, and be-
havioral clues to guide a response behavior. That would still make
the still domain-specific and functionally dedicated, but without
any mentalist import. In general, if ecology-sensitive assumptions
and divisions of labor are not factored into the analysis of a ToM
skill, it may be hard to devise experiments that reveal its nature,
particularly when assumptions or divisions of labor or both are vi-
olated, as they may well be in laboratory contexts.
An evolutionary perspective, absent from Heyes’s target article,
would do more than reveal assumptions and divisions of labor. It
could also suggest, perhaps better than observation and experi-
ment, whether there were selective pressures and opportunities for
a specialized ToM competence. Such a suggestion would not set-
tle the matter but would most likely constrain and inform the the-
oretical expectations. An analysis of the genetic proximity between
apes and humans could further narrow the estimates. As important
and complementary would be an inquiry into the maturational
schedule of the presumed ToM skills. What convinced many re-
searchers that humans develop a specialized ToM competence was
the tight ontogenetic scheduling of some of its key skills. Such a
schedule suggests genetic expression and the latter in turn suggests
some evolutionary pedigree. I would accordingly be advisable to
see whether there is such an ontogenetic scheduling in ape infancy
and childhood as well, particularly for skills, such as gaze recogni-
tion and gaze following, which many researchers regard as domain-
specialized and probably inherited by humans.
Finally, a look at the evolution of ToM skills in primates may also
shed light on the interpersonal, cultural, and linguistic pressures
and opportunities that eventually led to mentalist ToM skills in hu-
mans. Whatever the form of these skills (modular, naively theo-
retical, inferential), the fact that they had to factor in mental con-
ditions with causal powers must be explained (instead of assumed)
and so must the very possibility of this factoring. It is rather un-
likely that such a possibility sprang into existence out of nowhere,
without domain-specific and dedicated precursors that reach back
into primate phylogeny. Nor should it be any surprise (should it?)
that these precursor skills do not look human and do not operate
as they do in humans.
Theory of mind and the “somatic 
marker mechanism” (SMM)
Bruce G. Charlton
Department of Psychology, University of Newcastle upon Tyne, NE1 7RU,
United Kingdom, bruce.g.charlton@ncl.ac.uk
www.hedweb.com/bgcharlton/
Abstract: The “somatic marker mechanism” (SMM; Damasio 1994) is
proposed as the cognitive and neural basis of the theory of mind mecha-
nism. The SMM evolved for evaluating the intentions, dispositions, and re-
lationships of conspecifics; hence, it is adaptive in the social domain. It is
predicted that chimpanzees will indeed have theory of mind (ToM) abil-
ity, but that this will be socially domain-specific. Domain-general ToM will
be found only in primates with abstract, symbolic language (adult hu-
mans). Putative ToM tests require revision in the light of these distinctions.
The nature of the putative “theory of mind mechanism” (ToMM),
and whether or not it extends beyond the human species, has cre-
ated great controversy among evolutionary biologists and animal
behaviorists – most recently in the form of Heyes’s 1998 BBS tar-
get article and the accompanying comments. Unfortunately, the
discussion of this topic omits what should be regarded as the key
neuroscientific references relevant to this topic: the work by Da-
masio and colleagues on the “somatic marker mechanism (SMM)
(Damasio 1994; 1995; 1996). I suggest that the SMM forms the
cognitive and neural basis of the ToMM (see Premack & Wood-
ruff 1978).
The most commonly used “pure cognitive” conceptualization of
ToM defines the mechanism in terms of a capacity to represent
the contents of other minds – that is, to represent their distinctive
mental states. This implies that ToM uses a two-fold cognitive rep-
resentation: a representation of the mind of a conspecific, and the
contents of that mind (leading to those witty cartoons of one
“thought balloon” inside another). The pure cognitive conceptu-
alization of ToM sees the representational mechanism as abstract,
symbolic, and domain-general.
The special qualities of “intelligence” seen in primates, how-
ever, are more plausibly seen as domain-specific and driven prin-
cipally by the demands of social living (Byrne & Whiten 1988;
Dunbar 1996). Hence, ToM should be conceptualized as a mech-
anism which evolved for, and is adaptively concerned with, un-
derstanding, predicting, and manipulating the behaviour of con-
specifics. The theory of mind mechanism is specialized for
representing social variables such as dispositions, intentions, and
relationships.
Theory of mind can be seen as the means by which overt be-
haviour is interpreted in the light of inferred mental attributes.
Most animals, lacking a ToMM, infer the meaning of behaviour di-
rectly from overt behavioural cues. But in an animal using ToM
cognition, the primary interpretative inference is “mentalistic,”
and overt behaviour is understood in the context of an ascribed
state of mind (e.g., Charlton & Walston 1998).
The selection pressure which led to the evolution of ToM was
probably the potential ambiguity of social behaviour when overt
behaviour is ambiguous (e.g., when behaviour is complex, multi-
valent, rapidly changing, or deceptive; Byrne & Whiten 1988;
Dunbar 1996). When cues are ambiguous, interpretation of a given
cue becomes dependent upon inferences concerning intentions,
dispositions, and relationships. For example, the approach of an-
other human may have several meanings. In the interpretative se-
quence “he is angry, and approaching me – therefore I must get
ready to fight”; the mentalistic ascription of anger is logically prior
to the interpretation of overt behavioral cues. If the ascription of
disposition were to be changed from “angry” to “happy,” then –
even when the immediately perceived cues are identical – the in-
ferred meaning of the overt behaviour “approaching me” (and the
implications for an adaptive response) would also change.
The work of Damasio (1994; 1995; 1996) and colleagues is cru-
cial to understanding ToM because it provides an integrated func-
tional and neural explanatory model of this behavioral sequence
and it defines the adaptive scope of the mechanism. Emotions and
feelings are brain representations of physiological states; these
reach awareness when projected to working memory as topo-
graphically organized patterns of neural activity. Fluctuations of
the inner bodyscape (i.e., emotional responses) form the means by
which social sensory inputs are evaluated and strategic social mod-
eling is performed. The somatic marker mechanism (SMM) there-
fore refers to the process by which changes in the soma (body) are
used to mark perceptual inputs when somatic and perceptual rep-
resentations are temporally juxtaposed in working memory. And
the class of perceptions in question relate specifically to social sit-
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uations since ToM evolved as an aspect of social intelligence and
to solve social problems.
As a plausible example in chimpanzees, a male stranger might
evoke the “fight or flight” response. This response comprises a
characteristic physiological state driven by the sympathetic ner-
vous system (vasoconstriction in skin, vasodilatation in muscles,
hairs standing on end, sweating, faster heart rate, etc.). Cogni-
tive representations of changing body state are continually con-
structed in the brain from feedback from the afferent nerves,
chemo-receptors, and other inputs. In an animal lacking a
ToMM, such cognitive representations of the changing body
state may affect behaviour – perhaps by provoking involuntary
flight. But in an animal with an SSM, a cognitive representation
of this changing body state may be projected to working mem-
ory (WM) where it becomes accessible to awareness as conscious
fear. The cognitive representation of “fear” may then be used as
a somatic marker when sustained in WM in temporal juxtaposi-
tion to the perceptual representation of the male stranger’s iden-
tity.
The juxtaposition of the somatic marker for fear with the
stranger’s identity that evoked it is assumed to create a novel cog-
nitive representation incorporating what is, in effect, the disposi-
tion of that individual. The combined representation is implicitly
one of “that fear-evoking stranger”: that is, aggression and hostil-
ity are attributed as a “theory” of the stranger’s mental contents.
The combined social identity/body-state representation can be
stored in long term memory, and when recalled to WM it will be
capable both of recollecting individual identity and re-enacting
the linked emotion of fear as a change in body state. Hence, social
identities and their relationships can be modeled (variously com-
bined and sequenced), and the consequences of this modeling
evaluated (as gratifying or aversive) by re-experiencing the en-
acted emotional body state. Somatic marking is therefore pro-
posed as the actual mechanism of ToM, and in this sense the SMM
is the basis of “mindreading” (to use Baron-Cohen’s 1995 term):
the SMM is a mechanism for inferring what are de facto intentions
and dispositions. Nonetheless, the SMM could be considered al-
most the reciprocal of the common cognitive conceptualization of
the ToMM. For example, hostility would not be represented di-
rectly as the hostile contents of another’s mind, but instead as the
reciprocal attribution of the feeling of “fear.” A “hostile” animal
would actually be represented by the SMM as a “fear-evoking” an-
imal – an identity “marked” by emotion.
I am arguing that the SMM will be found to comprise the basis
of the theory of mind mechanism in young children, chimpanzees,
and perhaps other nonhuman primates. However, in the existing
ToM literature, the essential features of the ToM mechanism have
been conflated with features that are actually attributes of abstract
symbolic language, and therefore unique to language-using adult
humans. Language is necessary for the two-fold representation
(cartoon double “thought balloon”) of other minds, and of their
contents. Hence, language provides extra capabilities for adult hu-
man ToM by allowing the representation of domain-general, non-
social knowledge.
The SMM theory predicts that chimpanzees will indeed have
“theory of mind”; but only in the social domain. This ToMM com-
prises an ability to represent and model the dispositions, inten-
tions, and social interactions of conspecifics. Because they lack an
abstract, symbolic language, chimpanzees would not be expected
to display a domain-general capacity to represent the nonsocial
“contents” of others’ minds when these extend beyond the social
domain.
Many of the putative “ToM tests” which have been used in chil-
dren and primates do not distinguish social and nonsocial domains.
Instead, they demand, for instance, inferences about knowledge
of spatial location, which lies beyond the scope of the SMM. This
failure to consider ToM separately in non-language users, has
probably served to perpetuate controversy over the species-distri-
bution of ToM. “ToM tasks” need to be re-designed to measure
SMM-specific reasoning processes. Only such socially specific
ToM tests can answer the question of how far ToM extends be-
yond humans throughout primate species, and whether it is found
in other social mammals such as elephants and dolphins.
NOTE ADDED IN PROOFS
The above ideas have since been expanded and refined in a book, Psychi-
atry and the human condition (2000).
How to solve the distinguishability problem:
Triangulation without explicit training
Robert W. Lurz
Department of Social Sciences, Indian River Community College, Ft. Pierce,
FL. rlurz@ircc.cc.fl.us
Abstract: Heyes’s (1998) triangulation approach to distinguishing a “the-
ory” of mind (ToM) from a “theory” of behavior (ToB) in chimpanzees fails.
The ToB theorist can appeal to the explicit training sessions and analogi-
cal reasoning to explain/predict the chimpanzees’ behaviors. An alterna-
tive triangulation experiment is sketched, demonstrating how the removal
of such training sessions paves the way toward solving the distinguishabil-
ity problem.
There are two rival hypotheses about how nonhuman primates
predict/anticipate the behaviors of other animals. The “theory” of
mind hypothesis (ToM) maintains that such predictions/anticipa-
tions are mediated by mental-state attributions (e.g., Premack &
Woodruff 1978). The “theory” of behavior hypothesis (ToB) main-
tains that such predictions/anticipations are mediated by associa-
tive or inferential learning about stimulus-response contingencies
(e.g., Heyes 1993). A number of theorists have charged that con-
tinued research into ToM in animals faces an intractable method-
ological problem: It appears that any experimental datum that can
be plausibly explained/predicted by a ToM hypothesis – by as-
suming the animal in question takes stimulus S to be correlated
with mental state M and M with behavior R in another animal –
can be plausibly explained/predicted by a ToB hypothesis – by as-
suming that the animal in question simply learns that S is corre-
lated with R in another animal.
In the target article, Heyes (1998) attempts to solve this distin-
guishability problem by designing an experiment whose positive
results cannot plausibly be explained/predicted by assuming that
the test animals (chimpanzees) learn that a stimulus (eye-object
line) is correlated with a particular behavior (pointed to the baited
containers) in the trainers, but can only be explained/predicted by
a ToM hypothesis. Unfortunately, the positive results of Heyes’s
experiment can be explained/predicted by a ToB hypothesis that
allows analogical reasoning in chimpanzees. According to this hy-
pothesis, the chimpanzees come to learn that there is a correlation
between (S*) wearing the red-trimmed goggles with transparent
lenses in front of an object and (S) the object being directly be-
fore their eyes. After all, it’s reasonable to suppose that while wear-
ing the red-trimmed goggles before some object x, the chim-
panzees saw that x was directly before their eyes. Armed with this
information, the chimpanzees could very well choose the Knower
on the probe trials by choosing the trainer who had direct eye con-
tact with the baiting process. For the chimpanzees could reason
that since there was a correlation in their own cases between (S*)
wearing the red-trimmed goggles in front of an object and (S) the
object being directly before their eyes, the same S*–S correlation
holds between the Knower’s eyes and the baiting process. To head
off a possible objection here, it should be noted that (1) there is
suggestive evidence that chimpanzees are capable of analogical
reasoning (Gillian et al. 1981), and (2) positing such a capacity in
chimpanzees is quite consistent with the ToB hypothesis.
The mistake in Heyes’s triangulation experiment is the use of
explicit training prior to the probe trials that allows the chim-
panzees to associate/infer that observable cue S (eye-object line)
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is correlated with behavior R (pointing to the baited container) in
the trainers. I believe that once this type of training is removed, a
path is cleared toward solving the distinguishability problem. To
illustrate, consider the following triangulation experiment sans ex-
plicit training:
(1) Pretraining stage: the chimpanzees are allowed to examine
two pairs of goggles – red-trimmed goggles with translucent lenses
and blue-trimmed goggles with opaque lenses.
(2) Training stage: the chimpanzees are presented with four
containers, one of which is baited by a third trainer while the
Knower and the Guesser remain in the room. The baiting process
is done behind a screen so that neither the chimpanzee nor the
Knower or the Guesser sees which container is baited. After the
screen is removed, the Knower and the Guesser point to a differ-
ent container. The chimpanzees are trained to choose one of these
containers. If the container is baited, then the trainer and the
chimpanzee receive a reward while the other trainer does not; if
the container is not baited, then neither the trainer nor the chim-
panzee receives a reward while the other trainer does, provided
he chooses the baited container.
(3) Probe trial: During the probe trial, the chimpanzees observe
that both the Knower (wearing the red-trimmed goggles) and the
Guesser (wearing the blue-trimmed goggles) are directly facing
the baiting process while standing behind the screen with the third
trainer. The chimpanzees cannot see which container is being
baited as a result of the placement of the screen.
In this experiment, ToM and ToB have different predicted out-
comes. Since the chimpanzees are not taught in the training trial
that an observable cue, such as eye-object line or red-trimmed
goggles, is correlated with a particular behavior in the trainers,
such as pointing to baited containers, ToB predicts that the chim-
panzees will choose randomly. However, ToM predicts that the
chimpanzees will favor the Knower over the Guesser. For, ac-
cording to the ToM hypothesis, the chimpanzees learned that
wearing red-trimmed goggles in front of an object is correlated
with seeing the object and inferred that the same correlation holds
in the Knower’s case. Furthermore, ToM can suppose that during
the training trials, the chimpanzees learned that each trainer
wanted to be rewarded and believed that he would be if he chose
the baited container. A ToM theorist can postulate, as some have
(e.g., Segal 1996), that these mental-state attributions are plugged
into a ToM module that is partly defined by intentional laws, such
as: if one sees p, the (ceteris paribus) one knows p; and if one
knows p, wants r, and believes that one will get r if one does q when
p is the case, then (ceteris paribus) one will do q. From this, the
chimpanzees will predict that the Knower will point to the baited
container. Although this solution to the distinguishability problem
assumes a modularity thesis about animal ToM, I do not see that
this should prevent it from being a successful solution.
Author’s Response
Theory of mind and other domain-specific
hypotheses
C. M. Heyes
Department of Psychology, University College London, London WC1E 6BT,
United Kingdom. c.heyes@ucl.ac.uk
www.psychol.ucl.ac.uk/celia.heyes/netintro.html/
Abstract: The commentators do not contest the target article’s
claim that there is no compelling evidence of theory of mind in
primates, and recent empirical studies further support this view.
If primates lack theory of mind, they may still have other behav-
ior control mechanisms that are adaptive in complex social envi-
ronments. The Somatic Marker Mechanism (SMM) is a candi-
date, but the SMM hypothesis postulates a much weaker effect of
natural selection on social cognition than the theory of mind hy-
pothesis (on inputs to cognitive mechanisms, not on the mecha-
nisms themselves), and there is currently no evidence that it is spe-
cific to social stimuli or to primates. “Two Guesser” training would
make the goggles test too chauvinistic, and in its current form the
goggles problem could not be solved by physical matching be-
cause, while wearing goggles, an individual cannot see itself see-
ing.
Bogdan and Charlton apparently agree with the main
thrust of my target article, that there is no compelling evi-
dence of theory of mind in primates. However, they each
emphasize that if primates lack theory of mind as it is con-
ceptualized by those conducting empirical research with
primates (and therefore also in the target article), it does
not necessarily mean that primates lack domain-specific so-
cial cognitive abilities. Although this is obviously true, Bod-
gan’s and Charlton’s commentaries are valuable because in
making the point they raise important issues relating to the
formulation and evaluation of hypotheses about the evolu-
tion of social cognition. I will turn to these issues after re-
sponding to Lurz who, not yet ready to give up on theory
of mind in primates, suggests a modification to my goggles
experiment.
R1. Two Guessers
Lurz suggests that during the training phase of the goggles
experiment the chimpanzees should be required to choose
between two containers, one indicated by each of two train-
ers who are both guessing the location of the food because
their view of the baiting process was blocked by a screen.
This “Two Guessers” proposal contrasts with my “Knower-
Guesser” proposal (Heyes 1998, Response) that, during
training, chimpanzees choose between two containers, one
(which contains the food) indicated by a trainer who saw
the baiting, and another chosen at random by a trainer who
did not have visual access to baiting. In the Knower-
Guesser scenario, the chimpanzee is rewarded at the end
of every trial in which it selects the container indicated by
the Knower, and, on average, at the end of one in four tri-
als in which it selects the container indicated by the
Guesser. In the Two Guesser scenario, presumably, the
chimpanzee would receive food at the end of one in four
trials on average, regardless of the trainer he selects to use
as a cue.
For three reasons, I suspect that the Two Guesser sce-
nario would make the goggles experiment too chauvinistic,
that is, at high risk of yielding a false negative result. First,
the subjects may learn in the training phase that it does not
matter which trainer they choose, and this could transfer to
the probe trials, making them inattentive to which trainer
is wearing the red and which the blue goggles. Second, in
the Two Guesser arrangement subjects would be given no
hint during training that the problems set in this experi-
ment can be solved by discriminating between trainers ac-
cording to whether they could see a critical event. Thus,
chimpanzees that have the capacity to attribute sight may
fail to use it on probe trials because they do not realize it is
relevant to the test. Finally, if, as Lurz suggests, the sub-
jects have an opportunity during Two Guesser training to
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learn “that each trainer wanted to be rewarded and be-
lieved that he would be if he chose the baited container”
and if this information were necessary for successful probe
trial performance, it would make the goggles experiment
inappropriately complex, converting it from a test of attri-
bution of seeing, to a test of attribution of belief, desire, and
sight.
R2. Physical matching versus
analogical reasoning
These considerations would not provide sufficient reason to
use Knower-Guesser training if Lurz were right in sug-
gesting that, as the goggles experiment stands, Knower
preference on probe trials could be due to analogical rea-
soning based on the chimpanzee seeing itself seeing while
it is wearing the red goggles at pretest. But when I, or a
chimpanzee, put on the red, translucent goggles, I see what
is before me; I do not, as if from a combination of first and
third person perspectives, see myself wearing the red gog-
gles, the object before my eyes, and myself seeing that ob-
ject. This distinction is critical because, if the third person
perspective were afforded by my wearing the goggles,
Knower preference on the probe trials could be due to
physical matching of stimuli. In other words, the chim-
panzee may prefer the trainer wearing the red goggles over
the trainer wearing the blue because the former looks more
like the chimpanzee itself looked when it was wearing the
red goggles and its reaching movements were effective,
than like the chimpanzee itself looked when it was wearing
blue and its reaching movements were ineffective. It was to
prevent this kind of physical matching that I stressed in the
target article that subjects should not see others wearing the
red and blue goggles before the probe trials.
I assume that the goggles task requires analogical rea-
soning for its solution, but the critical analogy is between
the chimpanzee’s visual experience of the objects before it
while wearing the red goggles during pretraining (e.g., cage
walls, toys, its own limbs), and the chimpanzee’s view of the
trainer wearing red goggles on probe trials. The first of
these would be no more physically similar to the sight of the
trainer in red goggles than to the sight of the trainer in blue
goggles. Therefore, Knower preference on probe trials would
seem to require, not physical matching, but analogical rea-
soning along the lines: When I’m wearing the red goggles,
I see what is before me. That trainer is wearing the red gog-
gles, therefore he sees what is before him.
R3. Recent evidence
In agreement with Lurz and many others, I do not think
that the evidence that primates lack a theory of mind has
yet accumulated to the point where it is a waste of time to
conduct well-designed experiments in this area. However,
it is notable that the major experimental studies published
since the target article have either reported negative find-
ings (e.g., Call & Tomasello 1999; Reaux et al. 1999) or ac-
knowledged that the demonstrated social competence is
equally explicable in mentalistic and nonmentalistic terms
(e.g., Hare et al. 2000). Call and Tomasello (1999) found no
evidence of false belief attribution in a mixed group of
orangutans and chimpanzees tested using a non-verbal ver-
sion of the Sally-Anne task that had been validated with 4-
and 5-year old children. It is unfortunate that the apes in
this study had received extensive prior training in which a
marker stimulus, that had to be avoided in the false belief
choice tests (S-), functioned as a positive cue (S1). It would
be advisable for any future studies using the same design to
avoid this potential source of bias, and to ensure that the
subjects cannot learn over test trials that the marker is an
S-. However, as Call and Tomasello said, their false belief
study provides absolutely no encouragement for the view
that nonhuman apes can mentalize.
Hare et al. (1999) seem to present a more positive mes-
sage, entitling their article “Chimpanzees know what con-
specifics do and do not see,” but in the discussion they ac-
knowledge that their findings could be explained by a
variety of behavioral and cognitive nonmentalistic hypoth-
eses, as well by the hypothesis that chimpanzees attribute
sight. In the terms used in the target article, Hare et al.
show, at most, that chimpanzees can use “eye-object” line
as a cue in competitive feeding situations, that is, that their
choice of food targets can be influenced by whether or not
there is or has been an unobstructed line between a com-
petitors’ eyes and the food object. That’s smart, but, as Hare
et al. firmly emphasize, it’s not theory of mind – at least not
as “theory of mind” has been conceptualized by develop-
mental psychologists and primate researchers.
R4. Theory of mind and other 
domain-specific hypotheses
Bogdan characterizes the current conception of theory of
mind as “strong,” “unified,” and “naïve,” and argues that it
was a mistake to drag it, largely unchanged, from the realm
of day-to-day life into science. Instead of asking whether
primates have, or when children begin to use, psychologi-
cal resources defined by folk psychology or common sense,
we should allow the products of research (theoretical and
empirical) to inform a theory of the psychological resources
involved in the prediction and explanation of behavior. I
agree almost entirely with this argument, and if the target
article provides Bogdan with ammunition in this battle –
with examples of the vulnerability of research built on folk
theory rather than scientific theory – I will be delighted.
However, I say that I agree almost entirely because I would
take issue with three of Bogdan’s points.
First, Bogdan implies that I cast the theory of mind de-
bate as one in which primates will either be found to have
a strong, unified theory of mind, or shown to base all of their
social behaviour on associative learning. In fact, I have ex-
plicitly rejected such a dichotomy, in the target article (sect.
2) and elsewhere (e.g., Heyes 1993).
Second, like Charlton, Bogdan seems to be ready to la-
bel as “theory of mind” any psychological resources that are
found to underlie social competence in primates, or at least
any such resources that are domain-specific – involved pri-
marily or exclusively in social interaction. This is likely to
breed confusion, with some people assuming that “theory
of mind” refers to the “strong, unified” (Bogdan) or “ab-
stract, symbolic” (Charlton) psychological resources to which
it has referred over the last 20 years, and others using the
term to indicate any psychological processes mediating so-
cial interaction.
My final disagreement with Bogdan is more substantial
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than either of the others, and it emphasizes some virtues of
the “strong, unified” theory of mind hypothesis. Over the
last 25 years, at least since the “social function of intellect
hypothesis” (Humphrey 1976) was published, there has been
a great deal of broad brush theorizing about the evolution
of social cognition. What we need to do now is to convert
plausible stories about the adaptive advantages of domain-
specific social cognitive mechanisms into clearly specified,
testable hypotheses and to subject them to empirical eval-
uation.
Like Bogdan, I think it is unfortunate that the theory of
mind hypothesis came directly from folk psychology, but it
has two significant virtues: it is a strong hypothesis in that it
claims that social cognition is based on a distinctive psy-
chological mechanism, not merely that is has distinctive in-
put, and it is testable. If, as Bogdan and Charlton suggest,
the focus of empirical research on social cognition in pri-
mates should now shift to other potentially domain-specific
phenomena, the new hypothesis or hypotheses should have
the same virtues, and if they postulate a weaker kind of do-
main-specificity (e.g., Suddendorf & Whiten 2001), it
would be as well to recognize that retreat.
The somatic marker mechanism (SMM) hypothesis,
favoured by Charlton, is clearly specified, interesting, test-
able, and it may well be true, but it makes much weaker
claims than the theory of mind hypothesis about the effects
of natural selection on (social) cognition. As it has been for-
mulated by Damasio and his colleagues (e.g., Adolphs et al.
2000; Damasio 1996), the SMM hypothesis proposes that
humans learn associations between exteroceptive input and
somatic events characteristic of emotional response, and
that these associations, which are stored in somatosensory
cortices, modulate reasoning, and decision making. Thus,
the hypothesis does not postulate any domain-specific psy-
chological mechanisms (only associative learning, reasoning,
and decision making), and while SMM associative learning
has domain-specific input, its domain consists, not of social
interaction, but of all environmental objects and events that
provoke emotional responses. Furthermore, because a broad
range of species show emotional responses, encounter “am-
biguous” cues (Charlton), and are capable of associative
learning, there is little reason (and currently no evidence)
to suppose that the SMM is specific to primates.
It is beginning to look as if nonhuman primates do not
have a theory of mind, but of course this does not mean that
they lack behavioural control processes that are adaptive in
complex social environments. Indeed, the existence of such
processes is almost inevitable. The interesting questions are
(Heyes 2000): Have these processes acquired their adaptive
qualities phylogenetically or ontogenetically, and do they
include domain-specific cognitive mechanisms, in addition
to general-purpose cognitive mechanisms with domain-
specific inputs?
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Abstract: Schyns et al.’s (1998) target article raises a conflict between the
need for a fixed functional architecture in an explanatory cognitive science
and the need for a system to learn to detect new features. This conflict can
be resolved by avoiding the scope slip in which properties of objects are
erroneously viewed as being properties of their representations.
Cognitive theories are usually “software” accounts: They describe
some “mental program” that runs on the mind. Such theories are
attractive because they are functional – they avoid making any de-
tailed claims about the hardward (e.g., the brain) that is actually
executing the “mental program.”
Nevertheless, the explanatory power of a functionalist theory is
rooted in the properties of physical mechanisms. Cognitive theories
must ultimately be based upon a set of primitives whose perfor-
mance is subsumed by natural, physical laws (e.g., Cummins 1983).
In cognitive science, the proposed set of primitives for “mental
programs” is called the functional architecture (e.g., Pylyshyn
1984). If a functional architecture is not proposed (and validated)
for a cognitive theory, then this theory is merely a description, not
an explanation. This is because in the absence of a set of primi-
tives, a functional theory falls victim to the well-known homuncu-
lus problem (e.g., Edelman 1992, pp. 211–52).
One of the more intriguing themes running through the target
article is the notion that adequate theories of object recognition
or classification cannot be based upon a fixed functional architec-
ture. Instead, Schyns et al. (1988) argue that the architecture must
evolve according to the ongoing needs of a organism embedded in
a particular environment. This approach is interesting because it
has some alarming implications concerning the explanatory power
of cognitive theories.
Specifically, can one claim that a functionalist theory counts as
an explanation if its primitives are not fixed? For example, con-
sider a situation in which a particular theory, based upon a fixed
set of primitives, is criticized because it is not capable of recog-
nizing an object that is characterized by a novel feature. One re-
sponse to this criticism is to add to the existing model the capa-
bility of inventing a new primitive to represent the novel feature
at issue. It is not clear that his revised theory is explanatory. For
example, it is not at all obvious that such a theory would be falsi-
fiable, particularly if new critiques could also be dealt with by in-
venting new primitives.
The conflict between fixed and varying functional architectures
may emerge in the target article because Schyns et al. are the vic-
tims of what Pylyshyn (1981, p. 18) has called the scope slip.
Pylyshyn introduced the scope slip as part of the imagery debate.
He argued that the phrase image of object X with property P
should be correctly interpreted as meaning image of (object S with
property P). The scope slip involves a changed parsing of the
phrase which results in a markedly different and incorrect inter-
pretation: (image of object X) with property P. In other words,
when the scope slip is committed, the properties of objects are er-
roneously viewed as being properties of the underlying represen-
tation (see also Pylyshyn).
With respect to the target article, the scope slip can be charac-
terized as follows: Many cognitive theories of object recognition
are concerned with providing accounts of the representation of ob-
ject X with feature F. In some cases, feature F is a novel property
– perhaps the system has to learn to use this new feature, as the
evidence in the target article would suggest. Schyns et al. would
have us believe that this learning results in a new architectural
component, the (representation of object X) with feature F. How-
ever, it is much more likely that what is really at issue is the rep-
resentation of (object X with feature F).
For example, in most parallel distributed processing (PDP) net-
works, the initial set of connection weights is randomly selected.
As a result, prior to training, the network is unable to carry out a
classification task of interest. As training proceeds, the perfor-
mance of the network on the classification task improves. One rea-
son for this improvement is that the network is actually learning
about features of the stimuli. Indeed, and analysis of the internal
structure of a trained network can reveal that it has discovered in-
teresting features about the training set, and in some cases these
features are both novel and psychologically interesting (Berkeley
et al. 1995; Dawson et al. 1997).
Now the question is this: when PDP networks have learned to
detect new features, are these features new components of the
functional architecture? The answer to this question is that they
are not. The functional architecture of a PDP network is the set
of primitive network properties, including modifiable connections
and the kinds of computations carried out by processing units
(e.g., Dawson & Schopflocher 1992). When a PDP network learns
a new feature, it is not building a new primitive. Instead, it is tak-
ing an existing set of primitives (weighted connections, processing
units with a specific activation function) and organizing them into
a feature detecting circuit. When the scope slip is not made, it is
clear that the feature is a property of the stimuli that have been
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Abstract of the original article: According to one productive and influential approach to cognition, categorization, object recognition,
and higher lever cognitive processes operate on a set of fixed features, which are the output of lower level perceptual processes. In
many situations, however, it is the higher level cognitive process being executed that influences the lower level features that are cre-
ated. Rather than viewing the repertoire of features as being fixed by low-level processes, we present a theory in which people create
features to subserve the representation and categorization of objects. Two types of category learning should be distinguished. Fixed
space category learning occurs when new categorizations are representable with the available feature set. Flexible space category learn-
ing occurs when new categorizations cannot be represented with the features available. Whether fixed or flexible, learning depends
on the featural contrasts and similarities between the new category to be represented and the individual’s existing concepts. Fixed fea-
ture approaches face one of two problems with tasks that call for new features: If the fixed features are fairly high level and directly
useful for categorization, then they will not be flexible enough to represent all objects that might be relevant for a new task. If the fixed
features are small, sub-symbolic fragments (such as pixels), then regularities at the level of the functional features required to ac-
complish categorizations will not be captured by these primitives. We present evidence of flexible perceptual changes arising from
category learning and theoretical arguments for the importance of this flexibility. We describe conditions that promote feature cre-
ation and argue against interpreting them in terms of fixed features. Finally, we discuss the implications of functional features for ob-
ject categorization, conceptual development, chunking, constructive induction, and formal models of dimensionality reduction.
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presented to the network, and the representation of that property
is built from network components – not from features of the
world.
By avoiding the scope slip, and by correctly treating features as
properties of objects instead of properties of the architecture, it is
possible to create an explanatory account of a system that evolves
over time (e.g., by learning about new features). This is because
the architectural account of this system would describe how new
features emerge as representational properties. For example, an
architectural account of a PDP network would explain how a
learning rule, modifiable connections, and processing units would
al interact to create circuits that could be interpreted as being fea-
ture detectors. Note that such accounts are falsifiable, because ar-
chitectural accounts of PDP networks place strong constraints on
what can and what cannot be learned (e.g., Minsky & Papert 1969/
1988). In other words, by correctly treating features as being sep-
arate from the functional architecture, one should be able to make
some claims about what new features could be learned, as well as
about what new features could never be learned because they
could never be represented by the functional architecture.
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Abstract: Dawson’s provocative comment makes three connected
points: (1) to be falsifiable, theories that assume flexible features
must constrain their feature creation and mechanisms, (2) the ex-
planatory power of such functional theories is rooted in the prop-
erties of their underlying physical mechanisms, and (3) to derive
the relevant constraints of feature creation from these mecha-
nisms, it is critical to avoid the scope slip. We will argue here that
even though we agree with (1) and (2), (3) confuses two different
levels of analysis of computational systems: the functional identi-
fication and the physical implementation of relevant constraints.
R1. Constraints do matter
Dawson rightly points out that fixed feature theories can
always be criticized, and falsified, whenever their postu-
lated feature repertoire is not capable of recognizing an ob-
ject characterized by a novel feature. In contrast, a flexible
repertoire could, in principle, represent this novel feature
with the creation of a new feature. A flexible, improperly
constrained system might therefore be forever immune to
falsification because it could deal with new critiques by cre-
ating new features.
A properly constrained system will make falsifiable pre-
dictions about the features that can and cannot be created.
We agree about the need for these specific constraints and
in fact discussed what some of them might be (see sects.
2.5, 3.3, and 3.5 of Schyns et al. 1998; see also sect. R6 in
the same article). For example, Hoffman and Richard’s
(1984) minima rule (see target article, sect. 2.5) suggests
a perceptual bias to create parts with endpoints that are
local minima of principle curvature. A flexible theory of
part creation that includes this constraint would be falsi-
fied if people preferentially created parts with endpoints
that are local maxima of principle curvature (see also the
accompanying commentaries by Benson, McDorman,
Sing & Landau, and Tanaka on Schyns et al. 1998, for
other specific suggestions). In general, a theory of feature
creation will be as good as its constraining principles.
These, as argued in the target article, arise from the con-
straints of perceptual mechanisms, but also from the func-
tional requirements of segmenting the world into specific
categories.
R2. Implementing versus identifying constraints
The identification of relevant constraints is the lion’s share
of the task of modeling feature creation. However, whereas
the implementation of constraints is done in one specific
piece of hardware, their identification remains a functional
exercise, a point that Dawson does not seem to fully ap-
preciate. As Marr (1982, p. 27) famously pointed out, “in
order to understand bird flight, we have to understand
aerodynamics; only then do the structure of the feathers
and the different shapes of birds’ wings make sense.” Just
as the function of flying has been independently converged
upon by different organisms using different physical solu-
tions, any number of physical structures may allow a func-
tional constraint to be implemented. Thus, while every
functional constraint must be instantiated by some physi-
cal structure, a physical analysis alone will not reveal the
specifications that constrain the development of functional
features.
R3. Reduction of functional constraints 
to physical mechanisms
Dawson argues that functional features might suffer from
the scope slip because we view object representations as
(representation of object X) with feature F instead of the
proper representation of (object X with feature F). Dawson
argues that features should be left outside the functional ar-
chitecture of the cognitive system under study because, in
analogy with neural network models, features do not need
to be explicitly represented in connection weights for sys-
tems to behave as feature detectors.
Whereas we generally agree that networks and their dy-
namics offer at the moment the better implementation of
feature creation (see sect. 3.4 of the target article1), we be-
lieve that the functional level of analysis is mandatory, and
also that our proposal does not confuse object properties
with their representations (the scope slip). True to our
functional analysis of features, in R3.4 we stated that
“many . . . information packet[s] can qualify as features as
long as the system’s psychological response to the packet
reveals that it is a discrete, holistic entity in psychological
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processing.” In section R3.3, we discussed a dynamical
system that flexibly extracts silhouettes without explicit
silhouette detectors. At a functional level, this system sat-
isfies the global computational constraint of extracting
long and smooth contours in the image. The system is
properly constrained because it predicts that a specific
class of silhouettes (those made of long and smooth con-
tours) will be preferentially extracted. As required to
avoid the scope slip, the system does not confuse object
properties with their representation: The network will be-
have as a silhouette detector without an explicit represen-
tation of long and smooth silhouettes. The dynamics of the
network implements the global constraint with local ad-
justments of connectivity between edge detectors at a fine
granularity. The global constraint of detecting smooth sil-
houettes is lost in the reduction to the operation of the lo-
cal network elements.
In sum, constraints do matter for feature creation. Their
identification belongs to the computational level of analysis
of mechanisms, not the level of their implementation. Prop-
erly specified computational constraints can be reduced to
the dynamics of local computations, but the implementa-
tion of constraints does not itself diminish the need for their
functional identification.
NOTE
1. In fact, several specific proposals of feature creation are sta-
tistical principles implemented with networks (see sects. R5 and
R6.2).
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